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Abstract—In this paper, we discuss a general methodology
for analysis and modeling of trust relationships in
distributed computing. We discuss the classification of trust
relationships, categorize trust relationships into two layers
and provide a hierarchy of trust relationships based on a
formal definition of trust relationship. We provide
guidelines for the analysis and modeling of trust
relationships. We review operations on trust relationships
and relative types of trust relationships in our previous
work. We provide a set of definitions for the properties of
direction and symmetry of trust relationships. In order to
analyze and model the scope and diversity of trust
relationship, we define trust scope label. We provide some
example scenarios to illustrate the proposed definitions
about properties of trust relationship. All the definitions
about the properties of trust relationships are elements of
the taxonomy framework of trust relationships. We discuss
the lifecycle of trust relationships that includes the analysis
and modeling of trust relationships, trust relationships at
runtime, and change management of trust relationships. We
propose a trust management architecture at high level to
place the analysis and modeling of trust relationships under
the background of trust management.
Index Terms—trust relationship, properties of
relationship, life cycle of trust relationship,
management, distributed information system

trust
trust

I. INTRODUCTION
Many researchers have realized that trust has immense
significance in distributed computing. There are a lot of
researches to study or model trust across different areas.
The notion of trust has been around for many decades in
different disciplines in different disguises. In security, the
concept of “trusted systems” has been around explicitly at
Based on “Analysis and Modeling of Trust in Distributed
Information Systems”, by Weiliang Zhao, Vijay Varadharajan, and
George Bryan which appeared in the Proceedings of the First
International Conference on Information Systems Security 2005,
Kolkata, India, December 2005. © 2005 Springer.
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least since late 1970s [1, 2]. Trust is used in the concept
of convincing observers that a system is correct and
secure. Following this concept, Trusted Computing Base
and Trusted Platform become hot topics for both
academic and industry people. Trust is a complex subject
relating to belief or perception of the trusted entity [3].
Some researchers have tried to formalize trust as a
computational concept such as S. Marsh [4] and A.
Jøsang et al [5, 6]. There are many services and
applications that must accommodate appropriate notions
of trust and related elements of trust such as community
reputation and security credentials. Reputation-based
systems such as XREP [7], NICE [8] and P-Grid [9]
provide facility to compute the reputation of an involved
entity by aggregating the perception of other entities in
the system. Some reputation systems like TrustNet[10]
and NodeRanking[11] utilize existing social relationships
to compute reputations based on various parameters.
There are many trust management systems based on
credentials. Public key certificates X.509 and PGP use
credentials to deal with trust management problem. As a
further step, M. Blaze et al firstly identified trust
management as a distinct and important component of
security in distributed environments and proposed
PolicyMaker [12]. After that, several automated trust
management systems have been proposed and
implemented including PolicyMaker[12], KeyNote[13]
and REFEREE [14]. All the above systems use
credentials as evidence of required trust. Normally, there
are credential verification and secure application policies
to restrict access to resources and services [15]. Several
automated trust negotiation systems have been proposed
[16-18]. Automated trust negotiation is the approach to
establishing trust between strangers through iterative
disclosure of digital credentials.
Trust plays an important role in distributed information
systems. The properties of trust and how to define/model
trust relationships are important concerns in the analysis
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and design of distributed information systems. Actually,
there is no consensus in the literature on what trust is.
Though trust has been a foundational stone for security, it
has been a difficult concept to define clearly. In order to
reflect many of the commonly used notions of trust, we
outlined a formal definition of trust relationship in our
previous work [19]. In order to have a clear
understanding of trust relationships, it is desirable to have
taxonomy framework for describing and categorizing
trust relationships. The taxonomy framework will reflect
the different forms of trust relationships based on their
specific characteristics. Based on the formal definition,
we build up a taxonomy framework where a range of
useful trust relationships can be expressed and compared.
The formal definition of trust relationship provides corner
stone and starting point to analyze both commonly used
and some unique trust notions that arise in distributed
computing. Our main objective of this research is to
develop a sound understanding of trust and create a
powerful set of tools to analyze and model trust
relationships in distributed information systems. Our
target is to achieve a general methodology for analysis
and modeling of trust relationships in distributed
information systems.
Based on the results of our previous research [19], this
paper discusses the general methodology for analysis and
modeling of trust relationships in distributed computing.
After we review the definition of trust relationship and
discuss the classification of trust relationships, we
provide guidelines for the analysis and modeling of trust
relationships in distributed information systems. For the
properties of trust relationships, we review some results
about operations on trust relationships and relative types
of trust relationships in our previous work [19] and
provide a set of definitions to define the properties of
direction and symmetry of trust relationships and the
properties of scope and diversity of trust relationship. We
discuss the lifecycle of trust relationships that includes
the analysis and modeling of trust relationships, trust
relationships at runtime, and the change management of
trust relationships. We propose trust management
architecture based on our current understanding of trust
relationships in distributed information systems. In this
paper, we only provide some high level results of the trust
management architecture.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we provide the formal definition of trust
relationship. In Section III, we discuss the classification
of trust relationships. We categorize trust relationships
into two layers and provide a trust relationship hierarchy
based on our formal definition of trust relationship. In
Section IV, we outline some guidelines for the analysis
and modeling of trust relationships in distributed
information systems. In Section V, we discuss the
properties of trust relationships. Operations on trust
relationships and relative types of trust relationships are
defined. We define the properties about the direction and
symmetry of trust relationship and the properties about
the scope and diversity of trust relationship. Some
scenario examples are provided in this section. In Section
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VI, we discuss the lifecycle of trust relationships. In
Section VII, we provide a trust management architecture.
Finally Section VIII provides some concluding remarks.
II. DEFINITION OF TRUST RELATIONSHIP
Trust is a very general concept which can be used in
different context. In information technology, it is
desirable to have a formal definition for trust that can be
used for the purpose of computing. We have given a
formal definition of trust relationship with a strict
mathematical structure in our previous work [19]. This
definition of trust relationship has a broad expressive
power and it is the cornerstone of our trust taxonomy
framework. All trust notions discussed in this paper are
based on this definition. The definition of trust
relationship is expressed as:
Definition 1: A trust relationship is a four-tuple T =< R,
E, C, P > where:
– R is the set of trusters. It contains all the involved
trusters. It is a non empty set.
– E is the set of trustees. It contains all the involved
trustees. It is a non-empty set.
–
C is the set of conditions. It contains all conditions
(requirements) for the current trust relationship.
Normally, a trust relationship has some specified
conditions. If there is no condition, the condition set
is empty.
– P is the set of properties. The property set describes
the actions or attributes of the trustees. It is a nonempty set. The property set can be divided into two
sub sets:
• Action set: the set of actions that trusters trust
that trustees will and can perform.
• Attribute set: the set of attributes that trusters
trust that trustees have.
The formal definition of trust relationship can reflect
the commonly used notions of trust and provides a
taxonomy framework. When trust relationships are used,
the full syntax (four-tuple < R, E, C, P > must be
followed. Trust relationship T means that under the
condition set C, truster set R trust that trustee set E have
the properties in set P. The definition of trust relationship
provides a starting point for capturing different forms of
commonly understood notions of trust. The above strict
definition of the trust relationship is the basis for all
properties of trust relationships and it is the starting point
for the general methodology for analysis and modeling of
trust in distributed information systems.
III. CLASSIFICATION OF TRUST RELATIONSHIPS
Some researchers have tried to identify different forms
of trust relationships. T. Grandison et al [20] have given a
bottom-up classification and used the terms as resources
access trust, service provision trust, certification trust,
delegation trust and infrastructure trust. From the view
point of establishment or evaluation of trust relationships,
all the above trust types must build on a more basic trust
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relationship that is the authentication trust or identity
trust. We will categorize trust relationships into two
layers. Authentication trust is on layer one and other
types are on layer two.
Authentication has continuously been an important
topic in information security community. There are many
popular authentication schemes such as X.509 and PGP.
Authentication trust belongs to a separate layer and all
other trust types belong to another layer above the
authentication trust. This is illustrated in Figure 1.

behalves of trusters. A certification trust can be any
subtype of non-infrastructure trust based on the nature of
its property set.
Infrastructure Trust
Trust Relationship

Access Trust
Non-infrastructure Trust

Provision Trust
Mixture (A&P) Trust

Fig. 2. Trust Relationship Hierarchy
Certification
Resource
Service
Second Layer
Trust
Access Trust Provision Trust
First Layer

Delegation
Trust

Infrastructure
Trust

Authentication Trust

Fig. 1. Trust Layers
Note that trust types of layer two may not be
necessarily specified in terms of an identity. Anonymous
authorization belongs to access trust and it is an example
that there is no specified identity. Anonymous
authorization can be implemented using certificates with
capabilities. The real identity of the involved trustee will
not be revealed. For example, a customer has a certificate
for accessing some resources on the Internet. The
customer’s behaviors of accessing the resources can be
recorded. If it is desirable that the customer cannot be
identified, the related access trust is a kind of anonymous
access trust. Particularly for the resource access trust and
service provision trust, the anonymous authentication is
desirable in some cases. In such a situation, the layer of
authentication still needs to provide a mechanism to deal
with the same entity as the trustee in the whole scope of
the trust process. Normally, there is a temporary and
dynamic identification which will be uniquely connected
with the involved trustee in the scope of the trust process.
At layer two, trust relationships can be classified in
different ways. In the following, we will give another
kind of classification which is different from the bottomup classification of trust. Based on the strict definition of
trust relationship, trust relationships at layer two can be
classified according to the nature of the trustees in trust
relationship < R, E, C, P >. If E is an infrastructure, the
trust relationship belongs to infrastructure trust. If E is
not an infrastructure, the trust relationship belongs to
non-infrastructure
trust.
Non-infrastructure
trust
relationships can be classified based on the ownership of
the property set. If the trusters have the ownership of the
property set, the trust relationship belongs to access trust.
If the trustees have the ownership of the property set, the
trust relationship belongs to provision trust. If some
properties are owned by trustees and some other
properties are owned by trusters, then the trust
relationship belongs to mixture (A&P) trust. The
hierarchy of trust relationships at layer two is illustrated
in Figure 2. In such a classification, delegation trust and
certification trust are not independent types. The
delegation trust is a special form of provision trust,
trustees are the providers of delegated decisions on
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IV. GUIDELINES FOR ANALYSIS AND MODELING OF TRUST
RELATIONSHIPS IN DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Trust relationships between possible entities play
crucial roles in distributed computing. Analysis and
modeling of trust relationships requires identification of
sometimes subtle trust assumptions and normally it is a
challenging task. The analysis and modeling of trust
relationship must be integrated with other requirements of
the whole distributed information systems. With the life
cycle of the development of a distributed information
system, the modeling, implementing and maintaining of
trust relationships is an incremental, iterative process.
The life cycle of trust relationships share the following
basic steps although the details and the ordering of the
steps may be changed in some cases.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Extract trust requirements in system.
Identify possible trust relationships from trust
requirements.
Choose the whole set of trust relationships from
possible trust relationships.
Refine the whole set of trust relationships.
Implement the whole set of trust relationships.
Maintain all the trust relationships in system.

Trust requirements and trust assumptions belong to the
business requirements of an information system. The
analysis of business requirements is not the main concern
of this paper. Any way, our strict definition of trust
relationship and the properties of trust relationship
discussed and defined in the following section are helpful
to understand the possible trust issues and requirements.
How to define and maintain a good set of trust
relationships is one of the most important tasks of the
trust management in system analysis, system design,
implementation and maintenance. The follows are some
high level guidelines for the modeling and design of
quality trust relationships in distributed information
systems.
1.

2.

Completeness: The completeness means that all
trust relationships defined in the system can capture
all of trust requirements in the information system.
Sufficiency: The trust relationships defined in an
information system provide suitable level of
abstraction to permit meaningful and efficient usage
for all issues related with trust in the whole
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3.

4.

information system. If possible, a trust relationship
had better have more coverage and the total number
of trust relationships in the system can be reduced.
High Cohesion: A trust relationship has a narrow
mission. It had better be meaningful and easy to be
understood. The trust relationship itself has some
inherent maintainability. When the high cohesion
and sufficiency of more coverage conflict with each
other, there is trade-off between them.
Primitiveness: In an ideal system, all the trust
relationships defined and used in the system are
primitive trust relationships (primitive trust
relationship will be defined in Section V). There is
no information redundancy.

The analysis and modeling of the whole set of trust
relationships in a distributed information system is one
part of the analysis and design of the whole system and
they are dependent on or strongly coupled with the design
of other parts of the system. Normally, the analysis and
modeling of whole set of trust relationships is quite
complicated. The process has an incremental and iterative
life cycle. The initial set of trust relationships will be
smoothed and refined in multiple life cycles in the terms
of completeness, sufficiency, high cohesion and
primitiveness. However, these guidelines are at a very
high level and they are suitable for any task of analysis
and design in information systems. Definitely, they have
not touched the specific characteristics of trust in
distributed information systems. In order to better
understand the specific trust issues and situations and
provide suitable terms and tools to analyze and model
trust relationships, we need to study and define the
properties of trust relationships from different angles.
The goal of the general methodology for analysis and
modeling of trust relationships in distributed computing is
to help in the design, implementation and maintenance of
a distributed information system by highlighting the trust
issues inherent to the system. The general methodology
will provide not only guidelines but also terms and tools
for the analysis and modeling trust relationships in
distributed information systems. To achieve the above
target, we need to study the properties of trust
relationships from different angles. We will provide a
taxonomy framework of trust which includes important
properties of trust relationships in distributed information
systems. These properties include classification of trust,
the relations of trust relationships, direction and
symmetry of trust relationship, scope and diversity of
trust relationship and life cycle of trust relationship. We
will provide a set of definitions and operations for the
properties of trust relationships. These definitions and
operations can enable users to better understand the
specific trust issues and situations. From the view point
of system analysis and design, they can provide suitable
terms and helpful tools to enable the analysis, modeling,
implementation and maintenance of trust relationships in
distributed information systems.
V. PROPERTIES OF TRUST RELATIONSHIPS
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In this section, we will discuss the properties of trust
relationships in distributed information systems. We will
provide a set of operations and definitions for the
properties of trust relationships. These operations and
definitions can be used as enabling tools in the analysis
and modeling of trust relationships in distributed
information systems. We will provide scenario examples
to show readers how to understand and use the proposed
definitions about the properties of trust relationships in
the real world.
A. Operations on Trust Relationships
In this sub section, we provide a set of operations on
trust relationships. From the nature of trust relationship
and its mathematical structure, some new trust
relationships can be derived based on the existing trust
relationships. The operations of using two existing trust
relationships to generate a new trust relationship under
specific constraints and operations of decomposing one
existing trust relationship into two new trust relationships
under specific constraints are defined as follows:
Operation 1: Let T1 = ( R1 , E1 , C1 , P1) and T2 = ( R2 ,
E2 , C2 , P2). There is a set T = (R1 ∩ R2, E1 ∩ E2, C1 U
C2, P1 U P2). If R1 ∩ R2 = Φ or E1 ∩ E2 = Φ, T = Φ.
If R1 = R2 and E1 = E2, the operation becomes:
Operation 1A: Let T1 = (R, E, C1, P1) and T2 = (R, E, C2,
P2). There is a set T = (R, E, C1 U C2, P1 U P2).
If R1 = R2, E1 = E2 and C1 = C2, the operation becomes:
Operation 1B: Let T1 = (R, E, C, P1) and T2 = (R, E, C,
P2). There is a set T = (R, E, C, P1 U P2).
Operation 2: Let T1 = (R1, E1, C, P) and T2 = (R2, E2, C,
P). There is a set T = (R1 U R2, E1 ∩ E2, C, P).
If E1 = E2, the operation becomes:
Operation 2A: Let T1 = (R1, E, C, P) and T2 = (R2, E, C,
P). There is a set T = (R1 U R2, E, C, P).
Operation 3: Let T1 = (R1, E1, C, P) and T2 = (R2, E2, C,
P). There is a set T = (R1 ∩ R2, E1 U E2, C, P).
If R1 = R2, the operation becomes:
Operation 3A: Let T1 = (R, E1, C, P) and T2 = (R, E2, C,
P). There is a set T = (R, E1 U E2, C, P).
Operation 4: Let T = < R, E, C, P>. If there are R1, R2
and R = R1 U R2, there are trust relationships T1 = <R1,
E, C, P> and T2 = <R2, E, C, P>.
Operation 5: Let T = <R, E, C, P>. If there are E1, E2
and E = E1 U E2, there are trust relationships T1 = <R,
E1, C, P> and T2 = <R, E2, C, P>.
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Operation 6: Let T = <R, E, C, P>. If there are P1, P2
and P = P1 U P2, there are trust relationships T1 = <R, E,
C, P1> and T2 = <R, E, C, P2>.
This operation has the following special case:
Operation 6A: Let T = <R, E, C, P>. If there are P1, P2,
C1, C2 and P = P1 U P2, C = C1 U C2, If C1 is the
condition set for P1 and C2 is the condition set for P2,
there are trust relationships T1 = <R, E, C1, P1> and T2
= <R, E, C2, P2>.
The above operations can be used to generate new trust
relationships from the existing trust relationships under
some specific constrains. The Operation 1 deals with any
two trust relationships and a new trust relationship is
possibly generated (if the result is not Φ). The Operation
1A, 1B, 2A and 3A deal with how to use two trust
relationships to generate one trust relationship under
some specific constraints. Operation 4, 5, 6 and 6A deal
with how to decompose one trust relationship into two
trust relationships under some specific constraints.
Operation 1A and Operation 6A are inverse operations.
Operation 1B and Operation 6 are inverse operations.
Operation 2A and Operation 4 are inverse operations.
Operation 3A and Operation 5 are inverse operations.

E', C
C', P
relationship.

P'. T is a direct redundant trust

We now discuss several special cases of direct redundant
trust relationships based on the single tuple of trust
relationship. We believe that these special cases play
important roles in the analysis and design of trust
relationships.
TYPE 1: DRLR (Direct Redundant of Less Trusters)
Let T = <R, E, C, P>. If and only if there is a trust
relationship T' = < R', E, C, P> and R' R, T is a DLRredundant trust relationship.
Trust relationship T is DRLR-redundant trust relationship
means that there is another trust relationship with super
set of trusters and all other tuples are same as peers in T.

TYPE 2: DRLE (Direct Redundant of Less Trustees)
Let T=<R, E, C, P>. If and only if there is a trust
relationship T'=<R, E', C, P>$ and E' E, T is a DLEredundant trust relationship.
Trust relationship T is DRLE-redundant trust relationship
means that there is another trust relationship with super
set of trustees and all other tuples are same as peers in T.

B. Relative Types of Trust Relationships
In this sub section, we will discuss the relative types of
trust relationships. We will define the equivalent,
primitive, derived, direct redundant and alternate trust
relationships. We will classify the direct redundant trust
relationships into different types.

TYPE3: DRMC (Direct Redundant of More
Conditions)
Let T= <R, E, C, P>. If and only if there is an alternate
C, T is a
trust relationship T' = <R, E, C', P> and C'
DRMC-redundant trust relationship.

Definition 2: Let T1 =< R1, E1, C1, P1 > and T2 =< R2,
E2, C2, P2 >. If and only if R1 = R2 and E1 = E2 and C1 =
C2 and P1 = P2, then T1 and T2 are equivalent, in
symbols:

Trust relationship T is DRMC-redundant trust
relationship means that there is another trust relationship
with sub set of conditions and all other tuples are same as
peers in T.

T1 = T2  R1=R2 and E1=E2 and C1=C2 and P1=P2

TYPE 4: DRLP (Direct Redundant of Less Properties)
Let T = <R, E, C, P>. If and only if there is a trust
relationship T' = <R, E, C, P'> and P' P, T is a DRLPredundant trust relationship.

Definition 3: If a trust relationship cannot be derived
from other existing trust relationships, the trust
relationship is a primitive trust relationship.
Definition 4: If a trust relationship can be derived from
other existing trust relationships, the trust relationship is
a derived trust relationship.
Note: when a set of trust relationships are defined in an
information system, a derived trust relationship is always
related to one or more other trust relationships in the
information system. For an independent trust relationship,
it is meaningless to judge it as a derived trust relationship
or not.
Definition 5: Let T=<R, E, C, P>. If there is trust
relationship T' = <R', E', C', P'> and T ≠ T', R R', E
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T is DRLP trust relationship means that there is another
trust relationship with super set of properties and all other
tuples are same as peers in T.
Definition 6: Let T = <R, E, C, P>, T '= <R, E, C', P>
and C ≠ C'. T and T' are alternate trust relationships of
each other.
An alternate trust relationship means that there is an
alternate condition set for the same truster set, trustee set
and property set. Perhaps, there are multiple alternate
trust relationships. In distributed information systems,
multiple mechanisms and multiple choices are necessary
in many situations and it is the main reason why we
define and discuss alternate trust relationships here.

JOURNAL OF COMPUTERS, VOL. 1, NO. 2, MAY 2006

Scenario Example I: Consider an online e-commerce
service called FlightServ, which can provide flight
booking and travel deals. FlightServ is designed using
web services. FlightServ connects with customers,
airlines, hotels and credit card services (some of these
may also be web services). The whole system could be
very complicated, but in this example, we only consider
some basic trust relationships in the system. In the
system, customers are classified into normal flyers and
frequent flyers. Originally, some trust relationships are
modeled as follows:
TS1-1: Airlines trust normal flyers can make their airline
bookings, if they have address details & confirmed credit
card information.
TS1-2: Airlines trust frequent flyers with no condition
that frequent flyers can make their airline bookings.
TS1-3: Hotels trust normal flyers can make their hotels
booking, if they have address details & confirmed credit
card information.
TS1-4: Hotels trust frequent flyers can make their hotels
booking, if they have address details & confirmed credit
card information.
TS1-5: Credit card services are trusted by all possible
entities without any condition that the credit card
services will give the correct evaluation of credit card
information.
TS1-6: Credit card services are trusted by all possible
entities without any condition that the credit card
services will keep the privacy of credit card information.
For the above trust relationships in the system, based on
definitions and operations in section 3, we have the
following analysis:
– All above trust relationships are primitive.
– Using the Operation 3A, trust relationships TS1-3
and TS1-4 can be merged to a new trust relationship
TS1- (3)(4): “Hotels trust customers if they have
address details & confirmed credit card information
that customers can make their hotels booking”. If
TS1- (3)(4) has been defined in the system, TS1-3
and TS1-4 becomes DRLE trust relationships and
will be removed out of the system.
– Using the Operation 1B, trust relationships TS1-5
and TS1-6 can be merged to a new trust relationship
TS1-(5)(6): “Credit card services are trusted by all
possible entities without any condition that the credit
card services will give the correct evaluation of
credit card information & the credit card services
will keep the privacy of credit card information”. If
TS1-(5)(6) has been defined in the system, TS1-5
and TS1-6 becomes DRLP trust relationships and
will be removed out of the system.
We hope that the above scenario example can provide
a general picture for using the operations on trust
relationships and the relative types of trust relationships
to analyze and modeling trust relationships in distributed
information systems.
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In the following sub sections, we will provide more
definitions about the properties of trust relationship that
include the direction and symmetry of trust relationship
and the scope and diversity of trust relationship.
C. Direction and Symmetry of Trust Relationship
In this sub section, we will provide a set of definitions
for the properties of trust direction and trust symmetry.
The properties of trust direction and trust symmetry play
an important role in the analysis and modeling of trust
relation ships in distributed information systems. These
definitions provide general descriptions about the
properties of trust direction and trust symmetry. A
scenario example is provided to illustrate these
definitions and their usage. We hope that these definitions
can cover most situations in the real world and can be
used as standard scenarios for analyzing and modeling
trust relationships about properties of direction and
symmetry. In real systems, one or multiple kinds of trust
direction and trust symmetry can be chosen based on the
specified requirements of the information systems.
The properties of trust direction and symmetry are
related to each other and they should be cooperatively
used to analyze and model the properties of direction and
symmetry of trust relationships in distributed information
systems. For the properties of trust direction, one-way
trust relationship, two-way trust relationship and reflexive
trust relationship are defined. For the properties of trust
symmetry, symmetric trust relationships, symmetric twoway trust relationship, and the whole set of trust
relationships are defined. The details of the definitions
are described as follows.
Definition 7: One-way trust relationship is the trust
relationship with a unique trust direction from the
trusters to trustees.
One-way is the default feature of a trust relationship if
there is no further description. Two-way trust relationship
can be defined and used in information systems. Actually,
two-way trust relationship is the result of binding two
one-way trust relationships together. We define two-way
trust relationship as follows:
Definition 8: Two-way trust relationship TT' is the
binding of two one-way trust relationships T =< R, E, C,
P > and T' =< R', E', C', P' > with R' = E and E' = R. T
and T' are the reflective trust relationships with each
other in the two-way trust relationship.
In the above definition, “binding” is the key word. If
there are two one-way trust relationships between R and
E but they are not bound with each other, then they are
only two one-way trust relationships and there is no twoway trust relationship. When two one-way trust
relationships are bound together, there is a two-way trust
relationship and these two one-way trust relationships can
be called reflective trust relationships with each other.
If the trusters and the trustees are the same, the trust
relationship is reflexive. The reflexive trust relationship is
defined as follows:
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Definition 9: Trust relationships T =< R, E, C, P > is a
reflexive trust relationship when R = E.
–
The symmetry of two trust relationships could be an
important concern in the analysis or modeling of trust
relationships in distributed information systems. The
symmetry of two trust relationships is defined as the
follows:
Definition 10: If there is trust relationship T' =< R', E',
C', P' > which is the result of swapping trusters and
trustees in another trust relationship T =<R, E, C, P >
(the swapping includes all possible ownerships in
condition set and property set), there is symmetry
between T and T', T and T' are symmetric trust
relationships with each other.
In the above definition, the swapping of trusters and
trustees includes all possible ownerships in condition set
and property set. The two trust relationships have the
same condition set and property set except the possible
ownerships in them.
The symmetric/asymmetric two-way trust relationship
is defined as follows:

–

–

Definition 11: A two-way trust relationship TT' is
symmetric two-way trust relationship if there is symmetry
between T and T'; otherwise TT' is an asymmetric twoway trust relationship.
Sometimes it is necessary to discuss the symmetry of
all trust relationships between a truster set and a trustee
set, we have the following definition:
–
Definition 12: WTR(R,E) is the whole set of trust
relationships with same truster set R and trustee set E.
Definition 13: If every trust relationship in WTR(R,E)
has a symmetric trust relationship in WTR(E,R) and every
trust relationship in WTR(E,R) has a symmetric trust
relationship in WTR(R,E), the trust between R and E are
symmetric.
Scenario Example II: Here we use Microsoft’s domain
trust as a regressive scenario example to discuss the
properties of trust direction and trust symmetry defined in
this section. Domain trust allows users to authenticate to
resources in another domain. Also, an administrator is
able to administer user rights for users in the other
domain. Our general definitions for the properties of
direction and symmetry of trust relationships have
general expressive power and can cover broad range of
commonly used notations. The related concepts in
domain trust can be viewed as specific cases of these
general definitions. In the following, we will use our
terms defined in this paper to review some concepts in
domain trust.
– Based on definition 1 in section 2, the domain trust
can be expressed as “entities in domain A trust
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entities in domain B without any condition that
entities in domain B have the right to get access of
the set of resources in domain A”.
Microsoft’s domain trust includes both one-way trust
and two-way trust. In Microsoft’s domain trust, oneway trust is defined as a unidirectional authentication
path created between two domains. This means that
in a one-way trust between domain A and domain B,
users in domain A can access resources in domain B.
However, users in domain B cannot access resources
in domain A. Microsoft’s one-way trust is an
example of one-way trust relationship in definition
7. In a two-way domain trust, authentication requests
can be passed between the two domains in both
directions. Two-way trust is an example of two-way
trust relationship in definition 8.
The entities in same domain trust each other without
any condition that entities have the right to get access
of the set of resources in the same domain. This is an
example of reflexive trust relationship in definition
9.
There is symmetry in the two-way domain trust. The
two one-way trust relationships bound in the twoway trust relationship are “entities in domain A trust
entities in domain B without any condition that
entities in domain B have the right to get access of
the set of resources in domain A” and “entities in
domain B trust entities in domain A without any
condition that entities in domain A have the right to
get access of the set of resources in domain B”.
These two one-way trust relationships are symmetric
trust relationships with each other in definition 10.
Microsoft’s two-way trust is symmetric two-way
trust relationship in definition 11.
In domain trust, the WTR(A,B) based on definition
12 has only one trust relationship from truster
domain A to trustee domain B. For two-way domain
trust, the trust between domain A and domain B is
symmetric based on definition 13.

The above definitions about the properties of trust
direction and trust symmetry are new elements of the
taxonomy framework about trust. We believe that they
can cover most situations related with direction and
symmetry of trust relationship in the real world. These
definitions can provide suitable terms and can be used as
scenario examples in the analysis and modeling of trust
relationships in distributed information systems.
D. Scope and Diversity of Trust Relationship
In this sub section, we will discuss the scope and
diversity of trust relationship in distributed information
systems. The diversity of trust has been discussed by
Jøsang [14] who expresses trust in three diversity
dimensions. The first dimension represents trusters or
trust originators; the second represents the trust purpose;
and the third represents trustees. Jøsang uses the term
trust purpose based on the observation that trust is
relative to a domain of actions. In our formal definition of
trust relationship, trusters and trustees are two tuples and
they are similar to the terms of Jøsang. The origin
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diversity about trusters and target diversity about trustees
are straightforward and have been described clearly by
Jøsang [14]. Jøsang’s term of trust purpose is related to a
domain of actions. Under our taxonomy framework, we
will define trust scope label to take the place of the trust
purpose. There are multiple benefits of trust scope label
other than the trust purpose and they will be discussed
later in this sub section. The trust scope label is the
binding of the condition set and property set based on the
formal definition of trust relationship. The trust scope
label is a new element of our taxonomy framework. The
definition of trust scope label is expressed as follows:
Definition 14: A trust scope label is a two-tuple TSL =<
C, P > where C is a set of conditions and P is a set of
properties.
The details of condition set C and property set P can be
found in the formal definition of trust relationship in
section 2. Actually, trust scope label provides a new layer
of abstraction under the trust relationship that only
includes property set and condition set. To compare two
trust scope labels TSL1 =< C1, P1 > and TSL2 =< C2, P2 >,
we have the following rules:
1. C1 C2 and P1 P2 <=> TSL1 ≥ TSL2;
2. C1 = C2 and P1 = P2 <=> TSL1 = TSL2;
3. C1 C2 and P1 P2 <=> TSL1 ≤ TSL2;
4. In other cases, TSL1 and TSL2 can not be compared
with each other.
The trust scope label is beyond the trust purpose in
several aspects. Trust scope label composes of a subspace
of trust relationships (two tuples out of four tuples) and
describes the characteristics of the combination of
condition set C and property set P. Trust scope labels
could be treated as an independent subspace of trust
relationships in the analysis and design of overall
information systems. The property set in trust scope label
covers not only actions but also attributes of trustees.
Two trust scope labels could be compared with each other
based on the rules provided above.
Scenario Example III: Consider an online software
shop. We assume that anybody who wants to enter the
online shop must register as a member of the online shop
first. For describing the condition set and property set in
possible trust relationships between the shop and possible
customers, we use the following notations:
– p1 stands for that customers can read the
documentation of the software.
– p2 stands for that customers can download the
software.
– c1 stands for certificate of membership.
– c2 stands for the commitment of the payment for the
software.
– c3 stands for the payment for the software.
We have the following trust scope labels:
1. TSL1 =< {c1}, {p1} >
2. TSL2 =< {c1, c2}, {p1, p2} >
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3.

TSL3 =< {c1, c2, c3}, {p1, p2} >

Based on the rules to compare two trust scope labels, we
have
– TSL1 cannot be compared with TSL2 (or TSL3).
There is no obvious relationship between TSL1 and
TSL2 (or TSL3).
– TSL2 > TSL3. It means that the trust scope of TSL2 is
less strict than that of TSL3.
The scope and diversity of trust is another aspect to be
considered in the analysis and modeling of trust in
distributed information systems. The trust scope label
may be quite complicated and the above comparison rules
provide helpful tools in making judgments. The scope
and diversity of trust relationship may be coupled with
other trust properties such as trust direction and trust
symmetry.
VI. LIFECYCLE OF TRUST RELATIONSHIPS
A trust relationship has a lifecycle in distributed
information systems. The whole life cycle of trust
relationships includes several stages such as extracting
trust requirements in system, identifying possible trust
relationships from trust requirements, choosing and
refining the whole set of trust relationships from possible
trust relationships, implementing trust relationships in
systems and maintaining trust relationships in systems.
The life cycle of trust relationships includes three aspects:
analysis and modeling of trust relationships; trust
relationships at runtime; and the change management of
trust relationships.
A. Analysis and Modelling Trust Relationships
The general methodology for analysis and modeling of
trust relationships in distributed information systems is
the main concern of this paper. As an aspect of lifecycle
of trust relationships, the analysis and modeling of whole
set of trust relationships in the system is one part of the
analysis and design of the whole system and they are
dependent on or strongly coupled with the design of other
parts of the system. The analysis and design of trust
relationships is a quite complicated process. We need to
consider different aspects of the trust requirements in the
target information system. The formal definition of trust
relationship and the classification of trust relationship
provide a starting point for the understanding of all trust
issues. The operations and definitions provided in Section
V will be used as terms and tools to analyze and model
different specific properties of trust relationships in
distributed information systems. The properties of target
trust relationships are the main concerns to address trust
requirements in distributed information systems. When
we analyze a trust relationship, we must concern the
properties of trust relationships from different angles. The
operations on trust relationships and relative types of trust
relationships provide terms and tools to discuss the
relations between trust relationships. The definitions
about properties of direction and symmetry of trust
relationship and properties of scope and diversity of trust
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relationship provide terms and tools to discuss the related
properties. All the definitions can be viewed as scenario
examples in the analysis and modeling of trust
relationships.
The properties of trust relationships and relations of
trust relationships will reconsidered in the multiple
lifecycles of trust relationships. The modeling and
maintaining of trust relationships is an incremental,
iterative process. The set of the trust relationships initially
modeled in an information system will be smoothed and
refined in the life cycle of the information system to
address the change of trust requirements or to modify and
improve the information system.
The operations and definitions about the properties of
trust relationships provide a set of tools in the analysis
and modeling of trust relationships. These operations and
definitions are based on our current understanding about
trust relationships. It is possible to define more operations
and properties.
B. Trust Relationships at Runtime
Trust is a vast topic which not only includes the
analysis and modeling of trust relationships but also
includes the evaluation and establishment of trust
relationships at runtime. From the view point of system
analysis and design, it is convenient to define trust
relationship with truster set, trustee set, condition set and
property set as four tuples of the definition of trust
relationship. There are more arguments about why trust
relationship is defined based on set of trusters(trustees)
not on individual truster (trustee) [19]. From the view
point of system running, trust is always evaluated based
on one truster, one trustee, a set of condition and a set of
properties. The set of properties in the evaluation should
be a subset of property set in a trust relationship. An
instance of trust relationship is defined as follows:
Definition 15: When trust is evaluated based on trust
relationship T =< R, E, C, P > at runtime, only one
truster r, one trustee e and requested properties p will be
involved. There are r
R, e
E, c ≡ C, p P. The t
=< r, e, c, p > is called an instance of trust relationship
T.
An instance of trust relationship must be assessable at
runtime. The evaluating decision can be made by the
involved truster based on the conditions for the trusting of
the trustee with the set of properties. In Section III, we
have described the two layers of trust relationships. At
runtime, the authentication trust on layer one is always
evaluated at first, then the trust relationship on layer two
can be evaluated. The trust evaluation is actually to judge
that the conditions of a trust relationship can be satisfied
or not. Actually the conditions of trust relationship are
against different risks. The risks maybe come from
actions of trustee or third parties and unstable
environments. All conditions can be classified into two
subtypes as pre-conditions and post-conditions. Preconditions are existing evidences and they could be
evidence credentials from trustees, local stored data or
knowledge of trusters, environmental data, and remote
© 2006 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
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data from third parties (maybe community based
reputation). Post-conditions are post evidences (such as
non-repudiation or guaranty) that are commitments from
trusters. At runtime, trust is always between exactly two
entities. Trust is normally non symmetric, but symmetric
trust could be defined in specific situations based on
related definitions about the direction and symmetry of
trust relationship in Section V
C. Change Management of Trust Relationships
Normally, trust relationships are not static and it is
necessary to modify and refine them to reflect the
changing business requirements. Change management of
trust relationships focuses on how to introduce or update
trust relationships in a consistent manner and how to deal
with the dynamic evolution of trust relationships in
distributed information systems. Change management of
trust relationships is related with the analysis and
modeling, implementation, evolution, and management of
trust relationships in distributed information systems. In
dynamic environments, change management of trust
relationships is a challenging issue.
In order to accommodate new business requirements, it
may be necessary to introduce new trust relationships.
When new trust relationships are introduced, the change
management of trust relationships must be considered. It
may be necessary to remove some existing trust
relationships out of the system as well. These new trust
relationships or removed trust relationships are related
with some applications. It is possible that these
applications are executing during the change for
introducing or removing some trust relationships. There
are three possible strategies for the related change
management. The first strategy is to let all the related
executing applications be completed according to the old
trust arrangement. The second strategy is to abort all
related executing applications and restart the applications
according the new trust arrangement. The third strategy
is to allow a migration from the old trust arrangement to
the new one. There are some conditions for the third
strategy and it may be very complicated [21].
VII. TRUST MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE
Our main objective about trust research is to create a
powerful set of tools to enable trust management in
distributed information systems. The analysis and
modeling trust relationships is important in the trust
management but it is not the end of the whole story. How
to merge the trust relationships into the overall distributed
information systems is another important topic and it
provides lots of challenges. To provide an overall
solution for trust issues in distributed information
systems, we are currently working on a trust management
architecture. The main aim of the trust management
architecture is to establish infrastructure and tools of trust
management for developing distributed applications.
The trust management architecture must support a
wide range of different context-based trust policies. The
trust policies are normally task-specific and they may be
supported by multiple mechanisms. A trust policy can
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require one or multiple trust relationships. When a trust
policy is enforced, the required trust relationships in the
trust policy must be satisfied. The trust decision is
context-based and it is based on the evaluation of one or
multiple trust relationships.
To illustrate trust management architecture, we
propose TrustEngine to hold all trust related components
that could be separated from applications. The formal
definition of trust relationship is the starting point of the
trust management architecture. TrustEngine could
address applications' trust requests like a database query
engine. TrustEngine accepts request with input as a
trustor, a trustee, a set of conditions, and a set of
properties which describe the actions or attributes of the
trustees. Depending on the form of the query,
TrustEngine can return yes/no answer or additional
restrictions that would make the trust evaluation possible.
Trust relationships are defined and loaded into the
TrustEngine when applications are being developed. At
runtime, single instance of trust relationship is evaluated.
TrustEngine is a container for all trust components and
it has the flexibility to be expanded easily to hold new
trust components. Each component in TrustEngine
performs some trust function or has some data storage to
be used by other trust functions. TrustEngine has
TrustDatabase for storage of trust related data.
TrustEngine
includes
components
packages:
TrustControl, LocatingTrust, EvaluatingTrust and
ConsumingTrust. The architecture is expressed in the
following Figure.
TrustControl

LocatingTrust

EvaluatingTrust

ConsumingTrust

TrustDatabase

Fig.3. TrustEngine Package Hierarchy
TrustDatabase is the data storage of TrustEngine to
look after trust relationships and other trust parameters.
It is necessary for TrustEngine to have a persistent
storage mechanism for storing and retrieving information
about trust. The storage mechanism can be relational
database or data profile. After trust relationships have
been analyzed and modeled based on trust requirements
in an information system, these trust relationships must
be loaded into TrustDatabase before the information
system is running. There may be other data as trust
parameters that should be loaded into the TrustDatabase
as well. At runtime, it may be necessary to store instances
of trust relationships.
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TrustControl is the package for the overall
management and control of TrustEngine at run time.
TrustControl links applications and functional packages
of TrustEngine (LocatingTrust, EvaluatingTrust and
ConsumingTrust).
LocatingTrust is the package for finding the requested
trust relationship. It receives the request from
applications and finds the requested trust relationship
from TrustDatabase.
EvaluatingTrust contains all computing components
for the evaluation of a trust relationship. The evaluation
of a trust relationship is to check that the conditions of a
trust relationship can be satisfied or not. The conditions
of a trust relationship are against risks from evil actions
of trustees, evil actions from other parties, and unstable
environments. There are different conditions in a trust
relationship and there may be multiple mechanisms to
support the trust evaluation. The existing reputationbased systems and credential based systems can be
employed as components of trust evaluation. Any
successful systems or mechanisms for checking or
evaluating of evidence and reputation can be included in
EvaluatingTrust. Existing standards and successful
systems related to trust can be put into the trust
management architecture easily. EvaluatingTrust has
functional components for specific evaluating tasks such
as credential evaluation, reputation evaluation, stored
data evaluation, and environment evaluation. In real
implementation, the package of EvaluatingTrust will be
customized based on the requirements and normally some
components will not be involved. On the other hand, new
components may be added to support other mechanisms
or functions if necessary.
ConsumingTrust contains the computing components
for consuming trust. Consuming trust deals with how to
use the output of the evaluation of a trust relationship.
The evaluation of a trust relationship is not always be
consumed immediately. The result of evaluation of trust
relationship can be stored and distributed in different
ways. There are three normal ways to use the output of
trust evaluation. The first way is that the result of trust
evaluation is immediately used by consuming
applications. The second way is to generate credentials
with the result of trust evaluation as input. These
credentials will be used in the future by the same or other
applications. The third way is that the result of trust
evaluation is stored in database and the data will be
retrieved and used by applications in the future.
The main concern of this paper is about the analysis
and modeling of trust relationships in distributed
information systems. Trust management architecture is
the next step target of our research about trust. The details
of trust management architecture are beyond the scope of
this paper and they will be described in a separate paper.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have discussed the general
methodology of analysis and modeling of trust
relationship in distributed information systems. We have
discussed the classification of trust relationships and put
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authentication at layer one of trust relationship and other
trust relationships on layer two. We have proposed a
hierarchy of layer two trust relationships based on the
nature of four tuples of a trust relationship. We provide
guidelines for the analysis and modeling of trust
relationships in distributed information systems. We
review the operations on trust relationships and the
relative types of trust relationships. We provide a set of
definitions for the properties of direction and symmetry
of trust relationships. We define trust scope label to
model the properties of scope and diversity of trust
relationships. All the definitions proposed in this paper
are elements of our taxonomy framework of trust
relationships and they can be used as enabling tools in the
analysis and modeling of trust relationships in distributed
information systems. We provide some discussions about
the lifecycle of trust relationships. The lifecycle of trust
relationship includes the analysis and modeling of trust
relationships, trust relationships at runtime, and the
change management of trust relationships. We propose
trust management architecture for the overall solution
about trust issues in distributed information systems. The
trust management architecture is currently at a high level.
In real implementations, the properties of trust
relationships discussed in this paper will be customized
and configured based on the specific requirements. The
definition of trust relationship provides a starting point
and it is the cornerstone for our research about trust. The
classification of trust relationships is helpful for better
understanding of trust relationships. The guidelines for
analysis and modeling of trust relationships provide high
level guide to define a good set of trust relationships in
distributed information systems. The operations on trust
relationships and relative types of trust relationships
provide terms and tools to concern the relations of trust
relationships. The definitions about the properties of
direction, symmetry, scope and diversity of trust
relationships can provide suitable terms for the related
properties and they can be used as tools for enabling the
analysis and modeling of trust relationships in distributed
information systems. The discussed lifecycle of trust
relationships and proposed trust management architecture
place the analysis and modeling of trust relationships
under the background of trust management.
Web services can be viewed as specific distributed
information systems. In the web services paradigm, the
proposed properties of trust relationships and the general
methodology for analysis and modeling of trust
relationships can provide solid foundation to understand
and deal with trust related issues in WS-Trust, WSSecurity, WS-Policy and WS-Federation.
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